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Research

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Security Through Obscurity Considered Dangerous

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0. Abstract

Hiding security vulnerabilities in algorithms, software, and/or

hardware decreases the likelihood they will be repaired and increases

the likelihood that they can and will be exploited by evil-doers.

Discouraging or outlawing discussion of weaknesses and vulnerabilities is extremely dangerous and deleterious to the security of computer systems, the network, and its citizens.

Open Discussion Encourages Better Security

The long history of cryptography and cryptoanalysis has shown time

and time again that open discussion and analysis of algorithms exposes weaknesses not thought of by the original authors, and thereby leads to better and more secure algorithms. As Kerckhoff

noted about cipher systems in 1883 [Kerc83], "Il faut qu'il
n'exige

pas le secret, et qu'il puisse sans inconv'enient tomer entre les

mains de l'ennemi." (Roughly, "the system must not require
secrecy

and can be stolen by the enemy without causing trouble.")

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It is also against the ethos and laws of a number of countries to

disallow open discussion of science and technology.

Within the IETF, frank discussion of the flaws of proposed and actual

protocols has led to improvement versions. Hence, the IETF does not

discourage open discussion and analysis of cryptographic or security

methods, and enthusiastically encourages open and frank technical

discussion thereof in its research, working groups, mailing lists,

and all other discussion venues.

2. Revealing Vulnerabilities is Useful

Revealing and discussing vulnerabilities in hardware and software

products allows the users to protect themselves, and encourages

general protection and repair strategies.

On the other hand, there is a well-established culture of giving the

manufacturer of the vulnerable product a short but reasonable early

warning of discovered vulnerabilities so that they have an opportunity to repair them and or prepare to distribute patches or

work-arounds. Furthermore, it is better if developers have time to

test their patches; much of the current mess comes from inadequate

software testing.

The IETF supports and encourages the open but prudent discussion of

vulnerabilities in hardware and software in all appropriate
IETF

venues.

3. The Culture of Sharing

In parts of the hacker subculture, information is currency. That is,

by disclosing vulnerabilities or by providing exploit code, the

purveyor gains status. As a consequence, knowledge of
security holes

tends to spread rapidly.

By contrast, when security professionals withhold such information

from the community, the broader community does not have an opportunity to find solutions. In extreme cases, such as that described in [Bell95], the result can be that the bad guys know about

the problem long before most defenders do. That, in turn, likely

delayed the development of cryptographic security mechanisms for the

DNS [RFC2065].

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3. Security Considerations

This document is about security, and specifically warns about increased vulnerability if weakness in algorithms and products are

not able to be openly discussed.

4. Acknowledgments

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5. References

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